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Anti-Corruption Internationally: Challenges
in Procurement Markets Abroad—Part II:
THE PATH FORWARD FOR USING Procurement
Law TO help with development and the fight
against corruption
Daniel I. Gordon
Associate Dean for Government Procurement Law
The George Washington University Law School
I.	GROWING RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE
PROCUREMENT CAN PLAY IN NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
CORRUPTION
In international organizations as well as at the national and subnational levels, there is growing recognition of the role that improving procurement systems can play in supporting developing countries’ efforts to
improve the lot of their citizens as well as in battling the corruption that
drains public resources around the world. This is evidenced by both the
heightened level of activity taking place in the international arena and in
the increasing number of countries signing up to minimum procurement
standards. Key examples of recently revised international documents are
the 2011 Model Procurement Law issued by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Trade
Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO GPA). The
European Union (EU) is also in the midst of a substantial overhaul of its
Procurement Directive, and the World Bank is undertaking the first revision, after many years, of its procurement policy.
While important, these changes will not meet the sometimes unrealistic
expectations that some have. We discuss below the difference between harmonization (or convergence) and uniformity among procurement systems
and address how the growing acceptance of certain minimum standards
fits in. We then turn to the limits of what good procurement laws can
do to promote development and fight corruption, and point out broader
contextual issues that are likely to be key if we are to make progress in
the path forward.
II.

“HARMONIZATION” OF PROCUREMENT LAW IS MUCH
TALKED ABOUT – WHAT IS IT?
A.	There is a Worldwide Trend to Move Toward More-andMore Similar Procurement Rules

Whether we use the term “harmonization” or “convergence,” similarities
are much in evidence, if you compare UNCITRAL’s Model Procurement
Law to the WTO GPA to the EU’s Procurement and Remedies Directives.
Some of the key similarities (translating some terms to our American
parlance) are that procurement laws and regulations must be publicly
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available, potential bidders must generally be given a reasonable amount
of time to prepare and submit their bids, specifications in solicitations must
not be unduly restrictive, solicitations must disclose the government’s
evaluation criteria and follow them, and governments must ensure that
disappointed bidders have access to a forum that will consider protests.
The similarities reach further than these broad points. It is thus common for systems to distinguish between what we would call sealed bidding
(with public bid opening and price as the only evaluation criterion) and
procurements allowing non-price factors that can result in the selection
of other than the low-priced bid. Particularly significantly, more and more
systems require some sort of a “stay” on procurements to ensure that a
protester will have a chance to compete for a contract that it believes is
being awarded improperly to a competitor.
Moreover, these similarities reach beyond countries that have adopted
the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, have acceded to the WTO GPA
or are members of the EU. In every free trade agreement that the U.S. has
signed over the past 20 years, it has included government procurement
provisions that reflect the core requirements set out above, and that includes agreements with countries as diverse as the Dominican Republic,
Oman, Australia, Jordan, and Panama.
B.	Similarity Does Not Mean Uniformity
One could understand “harmonization” to mean a trend toward uniformity. That is, once harmonization runs its course, all countries will have
identical procurement rules. That, however, is not what is happening.
Two countries can have similarities in their procurement systems, but
still many – and critical – differences. In fact, the various international
agreements make no pretense of requiring identical rules. For example,
the EU Procurement and Remedies Directives set minimum requirements, but each one of the 27 EU member states can implement those
requirements as it wishes, and the result is that procurement rules are
not identical. That means that a French company hoping to obtain government contracts in Greece or Ireland or Finland, for instance, will have
to learn the procurement rules in each of those countries. No surprise,
therefore, that cross-border procurements are still relatively rare within
the EU, decades after harmonization of the member states’ procurement
systems through the Directives.
The same pattern can be seen in the context of a specific example from
the WTO GPA. Article XI of that agreement sets 40 days as the normal
minimum amount of time for submitting bids – but one country may use
a 40-day deadline, while another uses a 45-day timeframe and a third
one 50 days – a lack of uniformity that matters to a company considering
submitting a bid and that needs to check the differing rules in countries
that have acceded to the WTO GPA. In addition, a country that has acceded to the WTO GPA can have different rules for procurements that are
covered by the agreement and those that are not, for example, by having
shorter deadlines for bid submission for smaller purchases not covered
by the GPA.
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The differences go far beyond deadlines. Because the WTO GPA had
to be agreed among countries with very different procurement systems,
it merely sets a lowest common denominator threshold – an important
achievement in itself, but not a recipe for uniformity. That means that
the United States is fully compliant with the WTO GPA when we allow
subjective assessments of past performance, and subjective tradeoffs between price and past performance or other non-price evaluation factors
– while most other systems would view those subjective assessments as
problematic, if not illegal. Similarly, although both the U.S. and the EU
member states are bound by the WTO GPA, we routinely allow discussions
between the government and offerors during a procurement, while the
EU Procurement Directives strictly limit negotiations with bidders. One
more example: while we view it as the core responsibility of our protest
forums (the Court of Federal Claims and the Government Accountability
Office (GAO)) to tell the government that it should re-open a procurement
when the forum determines that a contract was unlawfully awarded,
most countries – notwithstanding the similarity of a requirement for a
protest forum – view it as beyond the power of a protest forum to call for
the termination of a signed contract.
C.	Similarity May Help Reduce Barriers to Entry, but the
Lack of Uniformity Limits That
In theory, at least, having more and more similarity among procurement systems should reduce barriers to entry. Thus, one would hope that a
bidder may be more willing to compete for a contract in a new government
market when its procurement rules look familiar, the country has committed to not using anti-competitive specifications, and so forth. Whether
the reality is so good is unknown – we simply do not have data. The little
information we do have – the data from the European Union – suggests,
as noted above, that companies are not obtaining contracts in foreign
markets, even within the EU. There could be many reasons for that, but
the lack of uniformity is certainly one candidate. For an Italian company
thinking of competing for a government contract in Poland (another EU
member state) or Singapore (another country that has acceded to the WTO
GPA), the challenge of learning the Polish and Singaporean procurement
rules must surely be a deterrent.
D.	Uniformity is Not Attainable, Nor Desirable
So should uniformity be on the international agenda? Should we view
efforts at harmonization as a failure, if they do not bring us to uniformity?
In the author’s view, the answer to both questions is: absolutely not.
First of all, uniformity is not attainable, at least not among sovereign states or in the foreseeable future. Anyone suggesting that the U.S.
should forego the benefits of negotiations with offerors, evaluation of past
performance, and “best value” tradeoff is simply out of touch with reality.
Similarly, no one should expect the EU to agree to adopt these aspects of
the U.S. approach to procurement. For that matter, even within the EU,
it is hard to imagine, as a political matter, the European Commission
in Brussels trying to dictate that all 27 member states of the EU adopt
identical procurement rules. Uniformity is simply not going to happen.
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What we have instead is neither uniformity nor “best practices,” but simply the lowest common denominator among very different procurement
systems. The best example of this is the WTO GPA, which accommodates
the very different procurement systems of countries that have acceded to
it, particularly the U.S. and the member states of the European Union.
More importantly, though, uniformity is not something that we should
be striving for. The United States, with our long history of the rule of law
and our strong protections against corruption, can allow the subjectivity
of past performance ratings and cost/technical tradeoffs, without fear
of widespread abuse – while, for many countries, the risk of corruption
makes use of those subjective tools unacceptable. Moreover, differences
in procurement systems often reflect countries’ varying institutional and
other histories, and having different rules is sensible. To give just one
example: for historical reasons, GAO, which is the U.S.’s supreme audit
institution, plays an important role in the adjudication of bid protests,
while in virtually every other country in the world, it would be viewed as
institutionally inappropriate for the national audit office to be functioning
as an administrative court resolving procurement disputes.
Another problem with advocating uniformity is that it assumes that
uniformity will open up procurement markets, but the opposite could be
the case. If other countries decided that they want to have uniformity with
the U.S. in terms of preferences for small businesses and domestic bidders, the result would be far more barriers to trade: every country could
set aside procurements for its small businesses, as we do, and, instead of
just one “Buy American Act,” we would have a Buy Italian Act and a Buy
Australian Act and so forth around the world.
In short, harmonization of procurement rules around the world has
led to growing similarities among various nations’ procurement systems.
There is not, however, uniformity among procurement systems, and that
is probably the way things will, and perhaps should, remain.
III.	THE LIMITED ROLE OF PROCUREMENT LAWS IN
PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT AND FIGHTING
CORRUPTION
A.	Improved Procurement Laws Can Be Helpful
Improving procurement law can help countries in developing
their economies and combating corruption, in at least two broad
ways. First, better procurement laws can provide direct benefits.
A legal requirement for competition for public procurement contracts
should reduce the frequency of sole-source awards, thus potentially bringing the benefits of competition as well as reducing the trade in public
contracts as rewards to friends and relatives of government officials. By
mandating transparency throughout the acquisition process, procurement
laws can also encourage more firms to compete for government contracts,
thus potentially leading to more vigorous competition with respect to
both price and quality. In addition, procurement laws can facilitate efforts
to fight corruption, by (to give one important example) giving oversight
bodies legal authority both to investigate allegations of unlawful conduct
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(through bidders’ protests or otherwise) and to impose corrective measures.
Although not viewed through the lens of the fight against corruption,
enactment of the U.S. statutory provision giving GAO authority to issue
protective orders in connection with bid protests, 31 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2)
(A), is an example of a procurement law that has enhanced accountability
of public procurements.
Second, reforming procurement laws can address the problems caused
by existing laws. In the author’s view, procurement laws benefit from
simplicity, clarity, and uniformity, and suffer from complexity and excessive detail. Although one can certainly criticize the amount of detail and
complexity in the U.S. procurement system, the simple statutory statement
in 10 U.S.C. § 2304 that, absent a lawful exception, “the head of an agency
in conducting a procurement for property or services … shall obtain full
and open competition through the use of competitive procedures ….” has
served the U.S. well. Moreover, procurement laws, if not revised periodically, risk creating barriers to improvement in governance and efficiency.
Thus, if a country’s procurement laws preclude the use of e-commerce in
procurement, the country will not be able to take advantage of the enormous potential that the use of the Internet offers, in terms of increasing
both competition and transparency. For that matter, if a country has not
revised its procurement laws in the past 20 years, it may not be permissible
for vendors and the government to use e-mail in communicating with one
another, whether it’s the government that wants to issue a solicitation or a
vendor that wants to submit a bid. Outdated procurement laws may also
not allow countries to take advantage of relatively new, but now widely
accepted practices, such as framework agreements (what the U.S. system
calls indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts) or use of non-price
evaluation criteria.
B.	The Impact of Improved Procurement Laws Is, However,
Limited
Notwithstanding these benefits from improved procurement laws,
changing the legal framework for awarding contracts has only limited
impact on the developmental benefit of procurements and on the struggle
against corruption, for two overarching reasons.
1.	Procurement Laws Generally Do Not Cover
Procurement Planning or Contract Administration
First, procurement laws almost invariably focus only on the middle
stage of acquisitions, the selection of the contractor. From providing timely
and meaningful notice to potential bidders on upcoming procurements to
enabling disappointed bidders a way to challenge the selection of a competitor, good procurement laws cover all the steps surrounding award of the
contract. What procurement laws typically do not cover, however, are the
steps before and after. Thus, planning for a procurement – the first step –
is not typically the subject of procurement laws. Whether the government
needs a new bridge may be a political decision (the U.S. experience with
a “bridge to nowhere” comes to mind), or a transportation infrastructure
decision, but it is, in most systems, not a decision affected by procurement
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law. Similarly, the decision to use a contractor to perform services, rather
than have government employees provide the services, is very often not
a subject covered by procurement law, if it is addressed in law at all. In
the U.S., those “insourcing” and “outsourcing” decisions straddle the line
between procurement and management decisions, with a heavy dose of
political considerations, but even in the U.S., those decisions are not ones
viewed as exclusively within the province of procurement law.
Procurement law does have a significant, if limited role, in the procurement planning process. The one very important role procurement law can
play is to prohibit unduly restrictive specifications and to allow potential
contractors to challenge specifications. That is the one aspect of procurement planning where international norms have developed in a positive
way. Otherwise, good procurement planning is very difficult to legislate.
The U.S. has tried to require adequate market research through legislation, but the impact of that legislation has been limited.
Perhaps even more important than procurement planning, everything
that occurs after award of the contract is often viewed as not part of
procurement law. In many countries, once the contract is signed, the role
of procurement law ends, and the role of the country’s ordinary contract
law begins. That bright line is evident in the international documents
related to procurement: neither the WTO GPA nor the UNCITRAL Model
Procurement Law nor the EU Procurement Directives address contract
administration (or contract execution or contract management, as that
phase is also called). Yet whether the concern is development or the fight
against corruption, contract administration is at least as important as
selection of the contractor. In terms of economic development, if a country
does an outstanding job competing a contract for a new highway with
significant developmental potential, but then does not supervise the contractor adequately, it may find that the contractor does not deliver what it
promised. Instead, what is delivered may be over budget or behind schedule or constructed using inferior materials or processes – if the highway
is ever built at all. In fact, weaknesses in contract administration may
undermine progress in improving the contract award process. Thus, a firm
may win a contract by intentionally overpromising, in terms of schedule,
price, or quality, knowing that it can recover, whether through corrupt
acts or simply ordinary contract changes, during performance.
2.	Procurement Law Details Matter Far Less Than What
Happens on the Ground
Even with respect to the middle step in procurements, the selection of
the contractor, there can be unjustified expectations. Time and again, there
has been excessive focus on the details of procurement law, while translation of the law into practice has gotten inadequate attention. Examples of
wasted focus on details of procurement law are legion. The Congress of the
United States has a long tradition of trying to micro-management procurement law, with little if any benefit. The European Union created a scheme
for “dynamic purchasing systems” in the 2004 Procurement Directive that
was so complicated that those systems have reportedly rarely been used.
The risk of time spent creating detailed regulation being wasted is par-
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ticularly common in areas where technology is rapidly changing, such as
e-commerce vehicles. Thus, in the U.S., much time and energy was spent
in the 1990s developing legal rules for a “Federal Acquisition Computer
Network” or FACNET – but the entire effort was eventually abandoned
in the face of the rise of widespread use of the Internet.
More complicated is the way these questions have sometimes played
out in discussions between developing countries and outside institutions
financing procurements in those countries, whether the outsiders are more
developed countries’ governments or international financial institutions.
The desire to insist that the laws governing the procurements be adequate
is understandable, since those laws will govern the way the procurements
are handled, at least with respect to the legal framework. Accordingly, it
is understandable that the outside institutions are skeptical of the use
of many borrowing countries’ procurement legal frameworks, and would
prefer to impose their own rules for purposes of procurements financed
by the outside institutions. Imposing outside rules often appears to be a
way to mitigate the risk of corruption and to improve transparency, especially because employees of the outside institutions are more likely to
be familiar with their own institutions’ procurement rules than with the
borrowing countries’ laws.
Yet all recognize that allowing the borrowing countries to use their
own procurement laws has advantages – in terms of strengthening the
domestic procurement systems as well as showing respect for the borrowing countries. Moreover, because, as discussed above, there are internationally only similarities, and not uniformity, with respect to procurement
rules, borrowing countries may find themselves having to use one set of
rules for procurements financed by one lending institution and another
set of rules for procurements, conducted at the same time but financed by
another lending institution. The resulting inconsistencies with domestic
law (and among lending institutions) not only do not help build domestic
procurement institutions – they may affirmatively weaken those institutions by diverting attention and resources from them due to the need to
invest time and energy learning and applying parallel sets of rules – a
challenging scenario that would cause problems even in countries with
the best developed procurement systems.
Moreover, all of this risks distracting from the bigger picture. An excessive focus on legal and procedural details of the contract award process
may lead to neglect of procurement planning and contract administration,
and even with respect to the contract award process that is the subject of
procurement law, the focus may be too much on rules and not enough on
reality. From the point of view of employees and consultants representing
outside institutions, the focus on the lending institution’s contract award
rules is comforting – they represent familiar terrain. But whether that
focus delivers results on the ground is another question entirely.
The fact is that even countries with highly developed, highly respected
procurement systems face significant challenges in implementation. There
are few countries in the world with procurement law systems as detailed
and as developed as the U.S. has – and yet the U.S. is plagued with per© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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sistent weaknesses in procurement planning and contract oversight, and
even conducting competitions for award is often challenging. To take one
simple example: the fact that U.S. law has full and open competition as
the legal default, with sole-source procurements requiring justification
and high-level approval in no way means that all sole-source contract
awards are legal justified (much less that they are all good practice). The
dozens of decisions issued by the Court of Federal Claims and GAO each
year in favor of protesters claiming violation of procurement law attest to
the difficulties that exist, even within a very sophisticated procurement
legal framework.
IV.	THE PATH FORWARD NOW MAY REQUIRE FOCUS MORE
ON PRACTICE THAN ON LEGAL DETAILS
There may be benefit in outside lending institutions agreeing that
borrowing countries may use their domestic procurement legal framework
when conducting procurements financed by those outside institutions,
much more often than is the case today. That does not mean that any legal
framework will do, nor that lending institutions should cease oversight
over the use of their loans (or grants) merely because a country’s legal
framework is viewed as acceptable.
A.	Shifting to a Principled Approach to Assessing
Countries’ Domestic Procurement Legal Systems
Rather than the current focus on details of procurement law, it may
be more useful to focus on the minimum essentials needed for a country’s
procurement system to be acceptable. While one could certainly improve
this list, what follows is intended to touch on the core points:
•

Procurement laws and regulations must be readily available
to the public

•

Competition for contracts should be the norm, absent a lawful
exception

•

Potential contractors must be given adequate advance notice
of procurements, including details of what the government
requires as well as the criteria that the government will use
to select the winning bid

•

Specifications must not be unduly restrictive of competitions

•

Qualification of bidders must be transparent and fair

•

Bidders must have access to a meaningful avenue for challenging specifications, exclusion from consideration, and contract
award

It is noteworthy that two potential issues are missing from this list.
First, nothing is said here about the procurement method used – the choice
among what Americans would call sealed bidding, negotiated procurement, simplified acquisition procedures, and micropurchasing. The choice
between sealed bidding and negotiated procedures is a complicated one,
although it is understandable that many believe that it is advisable for
countries with weaker governmental institutions, in general, and procurement systems, in particular, to stay away from negotiations. Similarly,

Int’l 2-17

© 2013 Thomson Reuters

NOTES
those countries may be well advised to rely as much as possible on price
as the sole award criterion, with needed technical features assessed on a
pass/fail basis (the equivalent of “low price, technically acceptable” in the
U.S. system). And while every system allows for more flexible and less
open and transparent procedures for small purchases, the core principles
should be competition, transparency, and accountability, even if deviations
are permitted for smaller buys.
Second, a ban on domestic preferences is not included in the list of
core points set out above. Opposing those preferences is understandable
for outside institutions dealing with developing countries, especially
since contractors from the rich countries would like access to the borrowing countries’ government procurements. The rich countries’ arguments
are, however, somewhat undermined by the fact that at least one highlydeveloped procurement system, the United States’, employs an extensive
web of domestic preferences, and it is hard to justify the U.S., at least,
insisting that a developing country not have the sort of domestic preference that the U.S. insists on for itself. It is worth noting, however, that in
smaller economies, the effect of absolute preferences for domestic sources
may sharply limit competition, and thus facilitate collusion among the
limited number of domestic suppliers, while opening up procurements
to foreign sources may disrupt that kind of collusion. If domestic preferences are allowed, price evaluation mechanisms may be preferable (for
example, by increasing the price of bids from foreign sources by 10 percent
for evaluation purposes), because they are not absolute.
Overall, under this principled-based approach, any procurement system that is consistent with the lowest-common-denominator approach of
the WTO GPA would certainly pass muster, as would others, whether they
followed the EU Procurement and Remedies Directives, the UNCITRAL
Model Procurement Law, the government contracting provisions of the
U.S.’s free trade agreements, or another similar model.
B.	Shifting to Focus on Performance and Results, Rather
Than Law
The challenge in shifting the focus from law to practice is the “how”
question, that is, finding realistic ways to ensure good practice. This is
a real and difficult challenge. In terms of procurement planning, while
outsiders can counsel developing countries about which procurements
are worthwhile, the ultimate decision about what to buy is obviously for
the country to make – although whether the outside institution agrees to
finance the procurement is, just as obviously, a decision for that institution to make.
Once a procurement is underway, and particularly once the contractor
has been selected, the key principles set out above can form a roadmap for
reviewing the process. For example, anyone wanting to assess the process
will want to know whether there were unjustified barriers to competition,
through restrictive solicitation requirements or failure to provide adequate
advance notice to potential bidders. If the country decided not to conduct
a competition, the reasonableness of that decision should be carefully
scrutinized. Where a competition was held, judging whether it was fair
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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and meaningful competition is not easy. The number of bids received can
be a useful measure, which is why the U.S. has come to focus on procurements that, while ostensibly conducted using full and open competition,
led to receipt of only one bid. Yet, if collusion is potentially present, even
receipt of multiple bids does not guarantee real competition.
In assessing whether there has been a fair competition, the most
important stakeholders, at least in theory, are the potential or actual
competitors that did not receive the contract. What is at issue is accountability for the contract award process, and disappointed bidders have the
most obvious stake in that, so that it is no surprise that a country’s bid
protest system – its domestic review mechanism – plays a central role.
The question of the adequacy of a country’s bid protest mechanism
demonstrates the risk of focusing on legal details. As a formal matter, a
country may address the requirement for domestic review procedures by
allowing disappointed bidders access to the country’s court system. Yet
in reality that solution may be meaningless. The court system may be
incapable, as a practical matter, of moving fast enough to provide disappointed bidders with timely relief; or the judges may be corrupt; or the
courts may lack the independence needed to challenge the government’s
conduct of procurements.
There are some minimum requirements for the legal framework for a
bid protest system, but they should not distract from the need to assess
what happens in practice. Thus, if the law does not provide some way to
correct improperly conducted procurements, it is inadequate. That can
be through an EU-type “standstill” imposed before signature of the contract, or a U.S.-type post-award “stay” of performance, or potentially in
other ways – but there must be some way for the protest forum to have
the problem in the procurement addressed. Also, if the law requires such
a quick decision on protests as to preclude meaningful review, that is a
problem, and an extremely short period (for example, 3 days) may well
be too short to allow for meaningful review.
But beyond those minimum parameters, the focus needs to shift to
practical questions, such as whether potential protesters are afraid to
file protests; whether the protest forum is independent of the contracting
entity; whether it has authority to obtain all the information, including
documents, that it needs to reach a decision; whether, in practice, it is
willing to rule against a government entity; and whether its decisions are
followed. Where the needed elements are present, protests can provide
meaningful accountability and help ensure that gaps between the legal
standards and reality are identified.
As to contract performance, again, any discussion needs to begin with
recognition of how challenging it is to ensure effective management of
contracts. The key is meaningful and timely oversight of the contractor,
but addressing that has institutional, budgetary, and political aspects. In
the U.S. experience, performance problems are particularly severe when
the government is not in frequent communication with the contractor
and there are not enough adequately trained government representatives
on the ground. Because contract changes – increasing the price that the
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government will pay, delaying delivery, or reducing the quantity or quality
of what is to be delivered – can undermine the value of the contract to the
government, a control mechanism requiring high-level and transparent
approval of more significant changes may be helpful. In the most extreme
situations, the U.S. has resorted to frequent external oversight reviews,
whether by GAO, inspectors general, or even Congressional committees,
but such measures must, by necessity, be reserved for the largest projects.
The construction of the Capitol Visitor Center in Washington, D.C., is
an example of a large project that was the subject of intensive external
oversight throughout performance of the contract.
V.

CONCLUSION

As efforts continue to improve procurement around the world, it is important to keep in mind that the goal is not uniformity, but creation of the
minimum legal standards required for a sound procurement system, with
the focus then shifting to the surrounding elements that can translate the
legal rules into good practice. That critical context includes, in particular,
respect for the rule of law; strong, democratic governmental institutions;
a public procurement workforce that is adequately staffed, compensated,
and trained; independent oversight, audit, and judicial institutions; a private sector that is willing and able to compete for government contracts,
and to speak up when procurement laws are not followed; and a free and
vibrant press.
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